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The basics of judicial protection in the EU legal order are clear and well established
since the early days. Neither the Member States nor the EU can escape the review
of legality of measures they have adopted, since the EU is based on the rule of law.
To that effect, the Treaties provide for what the Court of Justice calls a ‘complete
system of legal remedies’ (Les Verts).
However, in practice, Member States and the EU increasingly rely on informal
instruments for cooperation with third countries, especially in the area of migration
control, with important implications for the rule of law. The choice for informality
becomes particularly problematic when it affects the legal situation of irregular
migrants, including refugees because it makes it very difficult for them to challenge
these instruments in front of EU courts. This blog post explores the effects of EU’s
recourse to informality on the judicial protection of the rights of irregular migrants
by using the EU-Turkey Statement as an example. The Statement, also known as
the EU-Turkey ‘deal’, raises serious doubts as to whether the EU legal order indeed
provides for the promised ‘complete’ system of legal remedies.
Challenging the EU-Turkey Statement in front of the
European Court of Justice
The adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement affected the lives of many who crossed
the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands. According to the very first point of the
deal, all irregular migrants who made the crossing as soon as after two days the
Statement appeared on the website of the European Council (20 March 2016) were
to be returned to Turkey. To implement the deal, Greece passed Law No. 4375 for
the re-organization of its asylum system and the establishment of a fast-track border
procedure to apply to the Eastern Aegean islands. The latter entailed ‘an extremely
truncated procedure with fewer guarantees’. The execution of the crux of the deal
depended on the controversial assumption that Turkey was a Safe Third Country
(STC) in accordance with Art. 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
There are two main procedures available to individuals affected by the deal for
challenging its application under EU law. The first is the annulment procedure (Art.
263 TFEU) that can be brought directly in front of the CJEU, and the second one is
the preliminary ruling procedure (Art. 267 TFEU), which enables national courts of
the Member States to refer questions concerning the legality and interpretation of
Union acts to the CJEU. National courts need to make these references when they




The annulment procedure was already used by Afghan and Pakistani nationals
affected by the deal (NF, NG, NM) to bring cases in front of the General Court (GC).
They argued the Statement was an act of the European Council that established
an international agreement and should be annulled. The Court rejected that
argument ruling that the Statement was not an act of an EU institution, but one of
the Member States of the EU acting as Heads of State or Government. Hence, it
had no jurisdiction to rule on the cases. However, even if the Court were to find the
Statement to be an act concluded by an EU institution, the admissibility requirements
of the Court under the annulment procedure are notoriously strict. The requirements
of ‘direct and individual concern’ for applicants who wish to challenge an EU act
as defined by the Plaumann case still stand and make it extremely difficult for
individuals to mount a successful challenge.
The GC’s reasoning and conclusion in these cases have been widely criticized (see
here, here and here), mainly based on the argument that Member States had no
competence to conclude the deal on their own, as many issues covered by the deal
were within the exclusive competence of the EU. The hope that the appeal to the
CJEU would bring clarity on the issue did not materialize as the Court dismissed the
appeal as manifestly inadmissible for being incoherent and not specifying the points
where the GC erred in law. It has been argued that since the CJEU did not yet rule
on the matter, a national court could still refer questions for preliminary reference
regarding different aspects of the deal. In other words, the second one of the legal
remedies available to individuals under EU law has not been exploited yet.
The Preliminary Reference Procedure
However, t is no coincidence that there has not been a preliminary reference on the
issue so far. While theoretically, such a possibility exists, an analysis of the cases
brought before the Greek Appeals Committees and the Greek Council of State in
the context of the application of the EU-Turkey deal, sheds light on why that has
not been the case. The main issue around which the appeals revolved was whether
Turkey was a STC in line with Art. 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive for the
individual concerned. The issue of Turkey being a STC was not addressed in the
deal itself. Similarly, the fast-track border procedure (Art. 60(4) Law No. 4375), which
was introduced for the effective implementation of the deal, is not to be found in the
deal. That procedure, which was introduced by Law No. 4375, transposes various
provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive into Greek national law.
Both of these elements (Turkey as a STC and the fast-track border procedure) were
challenged in the case that reached the Greek Council of State. The Council of
State confirmed the finding of the Appeals Committee that the applicant’s claim was
dismissed as inadmissible on the basis of the STC concept and not on the basis of
the deal (para. 44). It found it unnecessary to refer a preliminary question on the
interpretation of the STC concept and found the diplomatic assurances provided
by Turkey (and by the European Commission) to be sufficient to declare Turkey
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a STC. It also confirmed the legality of the fast-track border procedure as it was
an implementation of the provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which
provided for the possibility of introducing such an accelerated procedure in ‘mass
influx’ situations. In other words, since the source of the tools to implement the
deal are to be found in EU law, which was transposed into national law by Law No.
4375, challenging the implementation of the deal in essence means challenging
these tools/concepts that derive from EU law. It seems very difficult to challenge
the legality of the deal itself, which is the source or the trigger for the adoption of
Law No. 4375. When coupled with other obstacles, such as detention, lack of legal
aid, and lack of information on their status, taking legal action to challenge the deal
comes close to being ‘mission impossible’.
Conclusion
This is not to say that it is overall impossible to challenge the EU-Turkey deal. The
CJEU would have looked into whether the deal was an agreement in disguise if the
annulment case had been brought by a privileged applicant such as the European
Parliament (EP). The fact that EP brought no action in front of the Court, despite
being sidelined during the process leading to the adoption of the deal, shows how
politically charged and sensitive the issue is. In the same vein, the possibility to
bring infringement proceedings (Art. 258 TFEU) was not even considered by the
Commission, as it was also involved both in the process leading to the deal and in its
aftermath in monitoring of its implementation. This demonstrates how difficult it is for
individuals to access courts and successfully challenge informal deals when Union
institutions and Member States collude to shield their actions from judicial review. In
those cases, the mantra of the ‘complete system of legal remedies and procedures’
rings hollow, and fundamental rights appear to be more ‘fundamental’ for some than
for others.
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